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Sense of agency refers to the experience of initiating and controlling actions in order to inﬂuence events
in the outside world. A disturbed sense of agency is found in certain psychiatric and neurological
disorders, most notably schizophrenia. Sense of agency is associated with a subjective compression of
time: actions and their outcomes are perceived as bound together in time. This is known as ‘intentional
binding’ and, in healthy adults, depends partly on advance prediction of action outcomes. Notably, this
predictive contribution is disrupted in patients with schizophrenia. In the present study we aimed to
characterise the psychotomimetic effect of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on the predictive
contribution to intentional binding. It was shown that ketamine produced a disruption that closely
resembled previous data from patients in the early, prodromal, stage of schizophrenic illness. These
results are discussed in terms of established models of delusion formation in schizophrenia. The link
between time and agency, more generally, is also considered.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
In humans, voluntary goal-directed action is accompanied by
an experience of initiating and controlling the action, and through
it, controlling the external world. This experience is referred to as
the sense of agency. A disturbance in sense of agency may lie at
the heart of psychotic symptoms such as delusions and hallucina-
tions, which are characteristic of schizophrenia - a syndrome that
also entails marked alterations in the perception of time.
Intriguingly, this sense of agency is associated with a subjective
compression of time, such that actions and their effects are per-
ceived as bound together across time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras,
2002; Moore & Obhi, 2012). This effect is known as ‘intentional
binding’ (Fig. 1A). In the standard version of the intentional binding
paradigm, participants judge the onset of either voluntary actions
(a key press) or the onset of a sensory event (a tone) presented
250 ms after the action. The perceived onset of the action is shifted
later in time in comparison to the perceived onset of actions in a.005
gy, Goldsmiths, University of
cense. baseline condition in which the action does not produce a tone.
Furthermore, the perceived onset of the tone is shifted earlier in
time relative to the perceived onset of tones in a baseline condition
in which the tone is presented without action. In short, a causal
action is experienced as occurring closer to the ensuing outcome
while the experience of the outcome moves closer to its causal
action. This binding effect is speciﬁc to voluntary action. When
actions are not under voluntary control the reverse pattern of
results is observed. It has therefore been proposed that intentional
binding is a viable implicit measure of sense of agency (Haggard
et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 2010; Moore & Obhi, 2012).
As noted, a disrupted sense of agency is characteristic of certain
psychiatric disorders, most notably schizophrenia (Frith, 1992).
Such would be the case, for example, in delusions of control, where
the sufferer has a compelling sense of actions being controlled by
an outside force. According to one inﬂuential model of sense of
agency, the so-called ‘Comparator Model’ (CM), disordered experi-
ences of agency in schizophrenia are produced by deﬁcits in
sensorimotor prediction. According to this view, the normal experi-
ence of agency is dependent on predictive motor control processes
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 2005). Speciﬁcally, an
efference copy of motor commands is used to predict the likely
sensory consequences of a voluntary action, and the comparison
Fig. 1. (A) The intentional binding effect. Voluntary actions and outcomes are temporally bound together in experience, whereas involuntary movements and outcomes
are separated in experience (see Haggard et al., 2002). (B) Operational deﬁnition of prediction in our study. A predictive contribution to action binding was derived from
subtracting the shifts in the temporal experience of action on ‘action only’ trials in 50% effect probability condition, from shifts on action ‘only trials’ in the 75% effect
probability condition.
Fig. 2. Data from previous studies on patients with schizophrenia and patients in
the psychotic prodrome. These data represent the predictive contribution to action
binding (i.e., the difference in binding on ‘action only’ trials in the 75% vs. 50%
condition. The greater this difference the stronger the predictive contribution).
Both studies replicated the predictive contribution to binding in healthy volun-
teers found by Moore and Haggard (2008). However, the two groups of patients
showed different deﬁcits on this task. Patients with schizophrenia showed no
signiﬁcant predictive contribution (from Voss et al. (2010)), whereas prodromal
patients showed an excessive predictive contribution (from Hauser et al. (2011)).
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informs sense of agency. A match between predicted and actual
sensory consequences of movement promotes the feeling of self-
agency, whereas a mismatch reduces it. According to the CM,
experiences of passivity in patients with schizophrenia can be
explained by impaired sensorimotor prediction during voluntary
action. This impairment would lead to a faulty mismatch between
the actual and expected sensory consequences. As a result, patients
experience a reduced feeling of self-agency for their movements.
In support of the CM, a number of studies on sense of agency in
schizophrenia have shown that patients have deﬁcits in sensorimo-
tor prediction (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 2000;
Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005; Synofzik, Thier,
Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2009). Compelling evidence also
comes from studies using the intentional binding paradigm. Moore
and Haggard (2008) conﬁrmed the contribution of prediction to
sense of agency in healthy volunteers. When actions frequently
produced an outcome, the shift in perceived time of action towards
the (expected tone) occurred even on rare ‘action only’ trials, on
which the outcome was omitted. This suggests that predicting the
outcome was sufﬁcient to generate the shift in perceived time of
action. This was conﬁrmed by the reduction in binding on ‘action
only’ trials in a condition where the tone was unpredictable. This
approach to exploring the predictive component of intentional
binding is shown in Fig. 1B: The predictive contribution represents
the difference in binding on ‘action only’ trials in the 75% condition
(where 75% of trials are followed by tones) vs. the 50% condition
(where 50% of the trials are followed by tones), and the more
positive this difference the greater the predictive contribution.
Using this same procedure, deﬁcits in sensorimotor prediction
have been observed in patients with schizophrenia and in
prodromal patients. However, the pattern of predictive deﬁcits
in these two groups is quite different (see Fig. 2). Patients with
schizophrenia show an absence of predictive action binding (Voss
et al., 2010), in direct support of the CM. On the other hand,
prodromal patients, those who experience symptoms pointing
towards a psychotic disorder but who do not yet meet diagnostic
criteria, show much stronger predictive action binding relative to
controls (Hauser et al., 2011).
In summary, the subjective perception of the timing of both a
causal action and its ensuing outcome offers an implicit measureof SoA. Moreover, it is possible to develop this measure in order to
determine the extent to which that sense emerges from a
predictive relationship between an action and its consequences.
This has been further reﬁned to offer a novel way to explore the
relationship between prediction, agency and timing in schizo-
phrenia and the emerging results suggest that while, overall,
disturbances in schizophrenia are compatible with disrupted SoA
(as measured by altered experience of the temporal relationship
between actions and outcomes), the precise nature of the disrup-
tion depends on the stage of illness and this interacts with the
degree to which the action is more or less predictive of the
outcome. In the current study, we sought to explore this further
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a drug model of early schizophrenia – on intentional binding.
Ketamine is a non-competitive NMDA receptor antagonist,
which, at sub-anaesthetic levels, produces a state in healthy
adults that resembles the perceptual disturbances of schizophre-
nia in several key ways. For example, it induces perceptual
changes, ideas of reference, thought disorder and some negative
symptoms (Ghoneim, Hinrichs, Mewaldt, & Petersen, 1985; Lahti,
Weiler, Tamara Michaelidis, Parwani, & Tamminga, 2001; Mason,
Morgan, Stefanovic, & Curran, 2008; Morgan, Mofeez, Brandner,
Bromley, & Curran, 2004; Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2006). Impor-
tantly, ketamine also reproduces aberrant experiences of agency
associated with schizophrenia. In a previous study using the IB
paradigm it was found that the magnitude of binding in patients
with schizophrenia was signiﬁcantly stronger than controls
(Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Voss
et al., 2010), an effect reproduced by administration of ketamine
in healthy controls, where the magnitude of binding on ketamine
was signiﬁcantly stronger than binding in the same participants
on placebo (Moore et al., 2011). Given the known neurobiological
effects of ketamine, the drug model also provides a window onto
the neurobiological basis of these aberrant experiences of agency.
A key issue concerning the ketamine model of psychosis
concerns the stage of the disease the drug most closely resembles.
Looking at the overall binding effect is unlikely to resolve this issue
as augmented overall binding is associated with both established
schizophrenic illness (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010) and
the psychotic prodrome (Hauser et al., 2011). However, the afore-
mentioned pattern of contrasting predictive impairments at differ-
ent stages of the disease provides an ideal opportunity for testing
this in the context of aberrant experiences of agency.
We replicated the design of the previous patient studies (Voss
et al., 2010; Hauser et al., 2011) to determine the effect of ketamine
on predictive action binding. If the effects of acute ketamine
administration are most redolent of the established schizophrenic
illness, then we would expect ketamine to reduce the predictive
contribution to action binding relative to placebo. Conversely, if the
effects are most redolent of the prodromal stage of the disease then
we would expect there to be a signiﬁcant increase in predictive
action binding on ketamine relative to placebo.
We also explored the link between these putative cognitive
effects of the ketamine challenge and the changes in subjective
experience also arising from it. In particular we were interested in
the relation between binding and changes in the experience of
body perception, as measured by the clinician-administered
dissociative states scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 1998). In a
previous study we found that the magnitude of the binding effect
on ketamine was positively correlated with the degree of changes
in body perception produced by the drug (Moore et al., 2011). In
the present study we sought to replicate this effect.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
14 participants were initially recruited to the study. Of these, 12 participants
completed both ketamine and placebo sessions (8 females; mean age 23 years).
The study was approved by Addenbrookes NHS Trust Research Ethics Committee.
Participants provided written, informed consent.Fig. 3. Trial structure in the agency condition (following Moore and Haggard
(2008), Voss et al. (2010); Hauser et al., 2011). Participants pressed the key at a
time of their choosing. In one condition the key pressed cause the tone on 50% of
trials. In another condition, the key press caused the tone on 75% of trials. If the
tone was played it was done after a delay of 250 ms from key press. Participants
judged where the clock hand was when they pressed the key.2.2. Experimental design
The study used a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomised, within-sub-
jects design.2.3. Infusion protocol
Participants were administered placebo (saline) or racemic ketamine (2 mg/
mL) as an intravenous infusion using a target-controlled infusion system compris-
ing a computer which implemented Stanpump software (S Shafer; http://www.o-
pentci.org/doku.php?id¼code:code) to control a syringe driver infusion pump
(Graseby 3500; Graseby Medical Ltd, Watford, United Kingdom). Stanpump was
programmed to use a 2-compartmental pharmacokinetic model (Rigby-Jones
et al.), to implement a complex infusion proﬁle designed to achieve pre-speciﬁed
plasma ketamine concentrations.
During the drug session, participants received ﬁrst low-dose ketamine (plasma
target 100 ng/mL) and then higher dose (plasma target 200 ng/mL). The inten-
tional binding task was completed at the low dose (other cognitive tasks were
completed at the higher dose). We decided to run the task at the lower dose as we
were mindful of the generic impairments in cognition and attention that may be
produced by ketamine, and which may therefore have an impact on task
performance.
Drug and placebo sessions were separated by at least one week. Participants
also underwent a clinical assessment (see below). The order of drug and placebo
visits was counterbalanced across all 12 participants (i.e., 6 participants completed
the ketamine session ﬁrst).
2.4. Intentional binding task
The basic trial structure is shown in Fig. 3. Participants watched a computer
screen on which a hand rotated around a clock-face (marked at conventional
‘‘5-minute’’ intervals). Each full rotation lasted 2560 ms. There were two agency
conditions: 50% outcome probability and 75% outcome probability. In these condi-
tions, participants pressed a key with their right index ﬁnger at a time of their
choosing. In the 50% outcome probability condition this key press caused a tone on
50% of the trials. In the 75% outcome probability condition this key press caused a
tone on 75% of the trials. When the tone was played it was done so after a delay for
250 ms. The clock-hand then continued rotating for a random period of time
(between 1500 ms and 2500 ms). When it stopped participants verbally reported
the time of their key press. These judgements were blocked, so participants only
made a single type of estimate on each trial in each block. To make the time
estimates, participants reported the position of the hand on the clock face when
they pressed the key. These two agency conditions consisted of 32 trials each.
They completed a further 32-trial baseline block of time estimates (baseline
action). In this block, participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing.
However, the key press never produced a tone, and on each trial participants
reported the time of the key press. These baseline blocks control for individual
differences in the time perception of actions. They also allow us to determine, and
control for, systematic differences in the temporal experience of these events
Table 1
Mean binding effects (ms) for each drug session (SD across subjects in parenth-
eses). Postdictive action binding is calculated by subtracting binding on ‘action
only’ trials from binding on ‘actionþtone’ trials in the 50% condition. The more
positive this difference the stronger the postdictive effect. Predictive binding, the
focus of this study, is calculated by subtracting binding on ‘action only’ trials in the
50% condition from binding on the same trials in the 75% condition. The more
positive this difference the stronger the predictive effect.
Drug
session
Condition
(%)
Trial type Action
binding
(ms) (SD)
Postdictive
action
binding
(ms) (SD)
Predictive
action
binding
(ms) (SD)
Placebo 50 Action only 2.0 (30)
Actionþtone 6.0 (30) 8.0 (27)
75 Action only 14.0 (42) 12.0 (48)
Actionþtone 2.0 (30)
Ketamine 50 Action only 1.0 (31)
Actionþtone 4.0 (33) 5.0 (31)
75 Action only 25.0 (21) 24.0 (38)
Actionþtone 34.5 (22)
Fig. 4. Prediction-dependent shifts in action binding (ms) on placebo and
ketamine. These shifts are calculated by subtracting binding on ‘action only’ trials
in the 50% condition from binding on the same trials in the 75% condition. The
more positive this difference the stronger the predictive effect. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
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1baseline) was randomised for each participant.
2.5. Data analysis: Overall action binding and predictive action binding
To calculate overall action binding, average judgment error (difference
between the estimated and actual onset of action) in the baseline condition was
subtracted from average judgement error across both outcome probability condi-
tions, irrespective of trial type (50% and 75% conditions, ‘action only’ and
‘actionþtone’ trials). The more positive the difference between these two average
judgement errors the more the perceived time of action was bound towards the
(putative) outcome. Following Moore et al. (2011) we predicted more overall action
binding on ketamine relative to placebo.
The predictive contribution to action binding was calculated in the same way as
previously described by Voss et al. (2010) and Hauser et al. (2011) (see Fig. 1B for
schematic). We ﬁrst calculated action binding in each outcome probability condition
for both ‘action only’ and ‘actionþtone’ trials. For this we subtracted the mean action
judgement error in the baseline action condition from the mean action judgement
error for each trial type in each condition. A positive value represents binding of the
action towards the (putative) tone. To calculate the contribution of outcome
prediction to action binding we simply subtracted the action binding score on ‘action
only’ trials in the 50% outcome probability condition from the action binding score on
those same trials in the 75% outcome probability condition. The resulting difference
represents the contribution of outcome prediction to action binding: The more
positive the difference the stronger that contribution.
Moore and Haggard (2008) have also demonstrated a postdictive contribution
to action binding. This is shown by an increase in the magnitude of action binding
on ‘actionþtone’ trials vs. ‘action only’ trials in the 50% condition (where outcome
prediction is minimal). Although we also present these data from ketamine and
placebo sessions for illustrative purposes, our analyses focus only on differences in
prediction. This is because deﬁcits in prediction have been widely implicated in
schizophrenia (postdiction less so) and because only differences in the magnitude
of predictive inﬂuences on action binding clearly distinguish between the different
stages of schizophrenic illness.
2.6. Clinical assessment
The Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al.,
1998) was administered at both 100 ng/mL and 200 ng/mL. Intentional binding
was run on the lower dose of 100 ng/mL (other cognitive tasks were run at the
higher dose). This consists of 5 subscales: body perception, environmental
perception, feelings of unreality, memory impairment, and time perception. Each
subscale consists of items (questions), and participants’ responses are coded on a
5-point scale (0: ‘‘Not at all’’ through to 4: ‘‘Extremely’’).
We focussed our analyses the ‘Body Perception’ subscale for the CADSS
administered at 100 ng/mL (the infusion level at which the binding task was
completed). This includes the questions: ‘‘Do you feel disconnected from your own
body?’’ and ‘‘Does your sense of your own body feel changed: for instance, does
your own body feel unusually large or unusually small?’’ We predicted a positive
correlation between overall action binding and scores on the body perception scale
(following, Moore et al., 2011).We also conducted further exploratory correlation
analyses between other variables.3. Results
Table 1 shows mean action binding effects and also postdictive
and predictive action binding for each drug session.
3.1. Overall action binding and predictive action binding
We found that ketamine signiﬁcantly increased the overall
level of action binding (i.e., action binding averaged across trials
and conditions), t(11)¼1.83, p¼ .048 (1-tailed). This replicates a
previous ﬁnding (Moore et al., 2011). This increased action binding
has also been observed in patients with schizophrenia (Voss et al.,
2010).
Of principle interest was the effect of ketamine on predictive
action binding. A paired-samples t-test on predictive binding scores
showed a signiﬁcant difference between placebo and ketamine,
t(11)¼2.37, p¼ .04 (2-tailed). Inspection of Fig. 4 and Table 1 shows
that ketamine engendered a signiﬁcant increase in the predictive
contribution to binding. This shows that ketamine selectively
increased the magnitude of binding on ‘action only’ trials in the75% condition vs. the 50% condition. This pattern of results resembles
previous data in prodromal patients from Hauser et al. (2011).
Furthermore, the magnitude of this predictive contribution to bind-
ing on ketamine (24 ms) was similar to that observed previously in
prodromal patients (27 ms; Hauser et al., 2011).3.2. Correlations between binding and CADSS scores
We also assessed the strength of correlation between these
binding measures on ketamine and scores on the CADSS. A priori
we expected a signiﬁcant positive correlation between overall
action binding on ketamine and scores on the ‘Body Perception’
sub-category of the CADSS (following Moore et al. (2011)). We
also present any signiﬁcant correlations following further
exploratory analysis of different variables.
Overall action binding showed near-signiﬁcant correlations
with body perception scores (r¼ .47, p¼ .06; 1-tailed). Although
not quite signiﬁcant, the positive correlation between overall
action binding and body perception scores is consistent with our
results from a previous study (see Moore et al., 2011). Predictive
action binding was not signiﬁcantly correlated with body percep-
tion scores (r¼ .41, p¼ .19; 2-tailed).
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analyses (all 2-tailed). There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation
between overall action binding on ketamine and overall CADSS
score (r¼ .61, p¼ .035) and also ‘Unreality’ (r¼ .59, p¼ .044).
There were no other signiﬁcant correlations. There was, however,
a near-signiﬁcant correlation between overall action binding on
ketamine and ‘Memory’ (r¼ .57, p¼ .05) and also a near-signiﬁ-
cant negative correlation between predictive action binding on
ketamine and ‘Memory’ (r¼ .55, p¼ .06).
3.3. Control analyses
We also performed several control analyses. In a ﬁrst analysis
we compared the mean standard deviation of time estimates
across all trials on ketamine vs. placebo. High standard deviations
reﬂect high variability in time estimates, indicating possible
difﬁculty with the intentional binding task (Moore et al., 2010).
We predicted that ketamine would increase the variability in time
estimates, so we used a 1-tailed test of signiﬁcance. This analysis
showed a signiﬁcant difference in the mean standard deviation on
ketamine (mean: 86.09 ms) vs. placebo (mean: 66.91 ms), t(11)¼
1.96, p¼ .04. Although this suggests that ketamine caused more
difﬁculty with the task we do not think that this can explain the
pattern of results with respect to differences in prediction on
ketamine vs. placebo. In particular, it is not clear how an increase
in variability would lead to an increased sensitivity to the
probability manipulation and a concomitant increase in binding
on ‘action only’ trials in the high outcome probability condition. If
there was a general effect of the drug on timing, we would have
expected a signiﬁcant increase in binding on both trial types.
In a second control analysis we considered the effect of drug
session order (i.e., placebo session ﬁrst vs. ketamine session ﬁrst).
It may be that the signiﬁcant increase in predictive binding on
ketamine was driven by a certain order of testing. We compared
predictive binding on ketamine vs. placebo (‘Drug’ factor), intro-
ducing ‘Drug session order’ as a between subjects factor. As
expected, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of ‘Drug’, F(1, 10)¼
5.18, p¼ .046. Crucially, there was no signiﬁcant interaction
between ‘Drug’ and ‘Drug session order’, F(1, 10)¼ .18, p¼ .68.
This suggests that drug order was not responsible for the effects
observed in this study.
In a ﬁnal control analysis we considered the effect of block
order (i.e., 50% condition ﬁrst vs. 75% condition ﬁrst). It may be
that the signiﬁcant increase in predictive binding on ketamine
was driven by a certain order of testing. For each drug session we
compared the magnitude of predictive action binding as a func-
tion of block order. There was no signiﬁcant difference in the
magnitude of this effect as function of block order on ketamine
(t(10)¼ .96, p¼ .36) or placebo (t(10)¼ .48, p¼ .64) (2-tailed). This
suggests that block order was not responsible for the effects
observed in this study.4. Discussion
Sense of agency is associated with systematic changes in the
subjective experience of time (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore &
Haggard, 2010; Moore & Obhi, 2012), an effect known as ‘inten-
tional binding’. We investigated the. impact of ketamine, an
important drug model for schizophrenia, on the action component
of this effect. In replication of a previous result (Moore et al., 2011),
it was found that ketamine signiﬁcantly increased the magnitude of
overall action binding. Moreover, the drug signiﬁcantly increased
the predictive contribution to action binding, an effect which
closely resembles the performance of patients with prodromal
symptoms of schizophrenia, reported in a previous study (Hauseret al., 2011). Critically, too, we demonstrated signiﬁcant relation-
ships between the effects of ketamine on this behavioural binding
effect and the psychotomimetic effects of the drug.
4.1. Hyper-binding and hyper-prediction: A common role of
prediction error?
The increase in overall action binding on ketamine relative to
placebo replicates a previous ﬁnding (Moore et al., 2011). Impor-
tantly, the magnitude of binding in patients with schizophrenia is
similarly increased relative to controls (Haggard et al., 2003;
Voss et al., 2010). This increase in binding therefore appears to be
a robust cognitive aspect of psychotic illness, and one that
ketamine is able to reproduce reliably.
Of central interest in the present study was the effect of
ketamine on predictive action binding. In healthy adults, a strong
expectation that an action will produce an outcome is sufﬁcient to
generate action binding (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado,
Deal, & Haggard, 2009). Compared to controls, predictive action
binding is reduced in patients with schizophrenia (Voss et al.,
2010), whereas it is increased in prodromal patients (Hauser et al.,
2011). In the present study we found that ketamine signiﬁcantly
increased the magnitude of predictive action binding, an effect that
is most redolent of the prodromal stage of the illness.
We have previously suggested that the overall increase in
binding may be linked to inappropriate prediction error signalling
(Moore et al., 2011). Prediction error refers to the mismatch
between expectation and occurrence, and is used as a teaching
signal to drive causal associations between events (Dickinson,
2001). Aberrant or inappropriately persistent error signalling is
observed in patients with schizophrenia (Corlett, Honey, and
Fletcher 2007; Murray et al., 2008; Schlagenhauf et al., 2009;
Fletcher & Frith, 2009) and also following ketamine administration
in healthy volunteers (Corlett et al., 2007, 2006; Corlett, Honey,
Krystal, & Fletcher, 2010). Since error is a signal to strengthen
causal associations, persistent signalling of error in schizophrenia
and following ketamine administration would be expected to
inappropriately strength action-outcome association, resulting in
the observed hyper-binding. One further possibility is that the
hyper-prediction found in the present study (and in prodromal
patients) is a consequence of hyper-binding, with strong action-
outcome associations forming the basis of future outcome predic-
tions. We are cautious however, in this speculation, given that the
known impact of ketamine on prediction error signalling could also
produce the opposite effect, rendering the experimentally manipu-
lated contingencies less clear in the drug-treated state. It is also
worth noting that certain studies encourage the opposite predic-
tion. That is, prediction error could reduce the strength of action-
outcome associations (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2004), which would
reduce the strength of prediction. Moreover, some studies on
intentional binding itself have shown that (temporal) unpredict-
ability reduces the binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002). Future
investigations should directly consider the effect of prediction error
on intentional binding, given the current uncertainty.
4.2. Correlations between binding and CADSS
Our correlation analyses suggest that the effects of ketamine
on intentional binding are closely related to the psychotomimetic
effects of the drug. Although not quite signiﬁcant, the positive
correlation between overall action binding on ketamine and
scores on the ‘Body Perception’ subscale is consistent with a
previous result (Moore et al., 2011). Taken together these results
imply a close connection between the sense of agency and the
experience of one’s own body (the ‘sense of ownership’). That
agency and ownership are so entwined has been recognised in
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& Gallagher, 2007) and psychological (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard,
2006) investigations. The results of the current study also suggest
that disturbances in this agency-ownership relationship may be a
core feature of psychotic illness.
4.3. Sense of time and sense of agency: Common neurochemical
bases?
The well-established relationship between intentional binding
and sense of agency suggests an intimate link between our
experience of the temporal characteristics of our actions and
our sense that we are the authors of these actions. While the
precise nature of this relationship is unclear, it is noteworthy that
schizophrenia, which, as we have described, is associated with
profound alterations in sense of agency, also entails an impair-
ment in temporal estimation (e.g., Rammsayer, 1990). This sup-
ports the proposed relationship between subjective timing and
agency, an observation consistent with the fact that key neuro-
transmitters thought to be disrupted in schizophrenia (dopamine
and glutamate) are also implicated in timing (Meck, 1996) and
SoA (Moore et al., 2010,, 2011). Furthermore, we have recently
shown that acute administration of ketamine, which can distort
the experience of time in healthy volunteers (Pomarol-Clotet
et al., 2006), produces selective deﬁcits in a task evaluating the
ability to compare successive temporal durations (Coull et al.,
2011). This suggestion is further supported by the fact that
regions thought to underpin sense of agency, such as the supple-
mentary motor cortices and basal ganglia, also underpin time
perception.
Given this evidence for a link between sense of agency and the
subjective timing of internally-generated and externally experienced
events, we should consider the possibility that the effects of
ketamine in the current study simply be related to a generic
perturbation of the ability to make temporal estimations, either
through direct effects on timing mechanisms or indirectly through
effects on attention. We do not believe that this is so, given that
action time was normalised to a baseline time estimate. Were the
deﬁcit to be non-speciﬁc it is unlikely that it would affect one
condition and not the other. Furthermore, the effect of ketamine was
selective, producing a signiﬁcant increase in binding on ‘action only’
trials in the 75% vs. 50% conditions. Finally, previous studies using
even higher doses of ketamine suggest that participants are able to
perform attention and working memory tasks without difﬁculty
(Honey et al., 2004,, 2003). In this way, a general effect on attention
and/or timing is unlikely to explain our results.
Finally, an outstanding issue concerning intentional binding is
whether the sense of agency is a cause or a consequence of the
subjective compression of time between actions and their effects.
More experimental work is needed to clarify this relationship.
However, an intriguing hypothesis (Stetson, Cui, Montague, &
Eagleman, 2006) is that sense of agency is the cause (rather than
the consequence). According to this view, we expect that out-
comes caused by our own actions are temporally contiguous.
Once we recognise that an outcome is contingent on our own
behaviour (i.e., we have a sense of agency for it), then a recalibra-
tion mechanism is engaged, bringing these two events closer
together in subjective time. In this way, the sense of agency
triggers a temporal contiguity prior that pulls actions and out-
comes together in subjective time. This suggests that perception
of time, as with other perceptions, may be strongly modulated by
prior expectancy. In this respect, the current ﬁndings might run
counter to our previous suggestion (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher,
2009; Corlett et al., 2010) that ketamine’s effects in part arise
from a weakening of feedback modulation and hence an attenu-
ated impact of prior expectations on current input.4.4. Limitations of the study
Certain limitations of the study must be acknowledged. On
placebo we failed to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant predictive contribution to
action binding. This limitation is perhaps explained by the within-
subjects design: given that each participant experienced action-
outcome pairings at varying contingencies, then it is possible that
predictions were less strong than they would otherwise have been.
Furthermore, our experimental procedure was necessarily shorter
than previous binding studies owing to time constraints inherent
in drug studies. As described above, one effect of ketamine may be
to artiﬁcially augment the magnitude of PE signals. This would
mean that the rate of learning is faster on ketamine compared
with placebo. Given this, one would expect the magnitude
of binding, and the inﬂuence of prediction, on placebo to be
attenuated in this shortened version of the task. This is precisely
what we observed. Finally, the magnitude of the predictive con-
tribution to action binding on ketamine (24 ms) was of a very
similar magnitude to prodromal patients (27 ms; Hauser et al.,
2011). This shows that ketamine produces a strikingly similar
predictive abnormality.
The limitations of the ketamine drug model of schizophrenia
should also be acknowledged. For example, whilst ketamine
produces a range of symptoms associated with endogenous
psychosis (arguably a broader range than other drug models of
the disease; Krystal et al., 1994) there are notable exceptions
(Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Furthermore, ketamine produces
changes that are not necessarily associated with schizophrenia,
such as euphoria (Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Indeed, we would
argue that ketamine actually presents a very limited model of
established schizophrenia, rather more compellingly reproducing
the early/prodromal symptoms, a suggestion in keeping with the
current ﬁndings. Despite these limitations of the ketamine drug
model, we do not think they signiﬁcantly undermine our inter-
pretation of the present data. We have shown, once again, that
ketamine boosts overall action binding, replicating the ﬁndings of
a previous study (Moore et al., 2011). This effect is also consis-
tently observed in patients (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al.,
2010). Furthermore, the pattern of predictive action binding in
healthy volunteers on ketamine is entirely consistent with that
found prodromal patients.
In this paper we have emphasised the importance of sensor-
imotor prediction for binding and the sense of agency. However, it
should be noted that information from various sources is likely to
be involved (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau,
& Newen, 2008; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). For example, Daniel
Wegner and colleagues have shown that the experience of agency
can be established even in the absence of movement (Moore et al.,
2009; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). In light of this, it has
been suggested that processes involving sensorimotor prediction
are unable to fully explain the sense of agency. Instead, they may
be limited to lower level, implicit aspects of this experience, which
is what intentional binding may be closer to.
Related to this, there is an ongoing debate concerning the
neurocognitive origins of intentional binding. For example, some
have emphasised the importance of sensorimotor prediction
(Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 2008), whereas others
have suggested that intentional binding depends on more general
predictive processes (e.g., Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011.). We
would suggest that both low level sensorimotor prediction and
higher level conscious expectation are likely to be important and
that their relative inﬂuence will be shaped by factors such as
context and cue reliability. This would be consistent with recent
optimal cue integration approaches which recognise the impor-
tance of various sources of information for intentional binding
and sense of agency (Moore & Fletcher, 2012).
J.W. Moore et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 377–384 383Finally, it has been suggested that intentional binding is
related to causality more generally rather than agency speciﬁ-
cally. However, there is little evidence to directly support this.
Some studies have shown that causality is a necessary condition
for intentional binding (e.g., (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore
et al., 2009). However, no studies have, to our knowledge, shown
that it is sufﬁcient (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for discussion).
Another possible source of evidence comes from studies showing
that binding can occur in the absence of voluntary action (e.g.,
Dogge et al., 2012; Moore et al., 2009). However, these effects
depend upon implied self-causation or the modiﬁcation inten-
tional content prior to the movement, both of which are highly
relevant to agency, rather than causality more generally.4.5. Conclusion
Despite the aforementioned caveats, the present study provides
strong evidence that ketamine may best reproduce a state resem-
bling the psychotic prodrome, rather than established schizophre-
nic illness. Using a measure of agency based on the subject
experience of time we found that ketamine engendered excessively
strong sensorimotor predictions. This closely resembles previous
data from prodromal patients. Given the concordance between the
effects of ketamine and prodromal patients, we suggest that this
further supports the use of ketamine as a tool to explore the genesis
of psychotic illness.References
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